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Swisher: Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest in Post-Conviction Practice

PROSECUTORIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
POST-CONVICTION PRACTICE
Keith Swisher*

Prosecutors, our ministers of justice, do not play by the same
conflict of interest rules. All other attorneys should not, and cannot,
attack their priorwork in transactionalor litigation matters; nor should
other attorneys unquestionably represent clients in matters in which the
attorneys themselves face disciplinary, civil, or criminal liability. When
prosecutors have likely convicted an innocent person, however,
prosecutors are asked to review their own prior work objectively and
then to undo it. But they understandably suffer from a conflict between
their duty to justice and their duty to themselves-their duty to seek the
release of the innocent person and their interest in avoiding
embarrassment and liabilityfor themselves and their offices. After this
Article shows a variety of ways these conflicts cause problems, the
Article demonstrates that these problems can be solved or mitigated by
simply restructuringthe post-conviction review process.

* Associate Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.D.,
B.S., Arizona State University. I owe many thanks to Bruce Green, Larry Hammond, Mark
Harrison, Karen Wilkinson, and Ellen Yaroshefsky for their comments on this Article (or a related
project discussed below) and to Stephanie Pitel for her excellent research assistance. All errors, in
fact or opinion, are mine.
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INTRODUCTION

What if someone you understandably believe to be guilty-say, Ted
Kaczynski, Adam Lanza, or Scott Peterson-is actually innocent? That
would be incredibly hard to believe.' What if, further, you were the one
who prosecuted and obtained the conviction? That would be even harder
to believe. 2 What if (last one) you were also supposed to review the new
evidence objectively and promptly undo the conviction? That would be
still harder to believe and to do, 3 and it would be a glaring conflict of

interest. With no offense intended to the many good prosecutors who
have, to their horror, convicted an innocent person, those same
1. See, e.g., Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech
Evidence by Prosecutors:Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1483 (2007)
(citing Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 319); Aviva Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with
ProsecutorialDenial in Postconviction Cases ofActual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 425
(2011) ("[W]e tend to view [being wrong] as rare and bizarre-an inexplicable aberration in the
normal order of things.... [I]t leaves us feeling idiotic and ashamed." (second alteration in original)
(quoting KATHRYN SCHULZ, BEING WRONG: ADVENTURES IN THE MARGIN OF ERROR 5 (2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialDiscretion and PostConviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 488-90 (2009) ("A prosecutor will
tend to view a conviction as a confirmation that his initial charging decision was correct and will
naturally discount new evidence of innocence.").
3. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 1, at 402-03. Professor Aviva Orenstein noted:
Rather than portraying prosecutors as megalomaniacal abusers of the adversary system
who will protect their win-loss ratios at any cost, a theory of denial posits that they
simply cannot face the fact of a wrongful conviction or its implications for the entire
system of justice. Ironically, a prosecutor's desire to do justice and the prosecutor's selfimage as a champion of justice render the fact of wrongful conviction particularly
painful. As a result, some prosecutors go to incredible lengths to deny the obvious rather
than face the fact that the justice system failed and they may have contributed to that
failure.
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prosecutors should not be the ones asked to reevaluate and to overturn
their own work. This short Article's primary purpose is to show and
solve this "conviction confliction."
Wrongful convictions are perhaps the gravest ethical tragedy in our
criminal justice system.4 Not only is an innocent person plucked from
society and forced to rot in prison for no reason-shattering the promise
to both him and the rest of us that we would let ten guilty defendants go
free to avoid convicting an innocent one 5-the guilty person is out
walking the streets and potentially committing further serious crimes.
Wrongful convictions are thus a tragedy, but they should not be
surprising. Any repetitive human endeavor will produce mistakesincluding and perhaps particularly prosecution.
We now know for certain that those mistakes have occurred:
innocent people are sometimes sent to prison, even death row.6 If we
look only at DNA-testing cases, there have been 302 exonerations to7
date, and the vast majority of those wrongfully convicted are minorities.
Since these cases were exposed, the problem of wrongful convictions
has not been miraculously cured.'

4. Along with two co-petitioners, I have petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court, requesting
that the court amend the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct to include the recent amendment to
Model Rule 3.8, which provides prosecutors with much-needed guidance in handling postconviction claims of innocence. See infra Part III. Because I was the principal author of the petition
and reply, I have borrowed liberally from those documents for this work.
5. See Am. Pepper Supply Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 93 P.3d 507, 509 (Ariz. 2004) (noting the
belief that "it is far worse to convict an innocent [person] than to let a guilty [person] go free"
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 373 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See
generally Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1997) (noting that most state
and federal formulations of the Blackstone maxim conclude that it is "better" to let one, ten, some,
or many guilty persons escape than to convict one innocent person).
6. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
(last updated Jan. 22, 2013)
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty
(describing 142 death row exonerees to date); Know the Cases: Innocence Project Case Profiles,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
7. Each year brings new exonerations. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 6
OF EXONERATIONS,
NATIONAL REGISTRY
by year);
(listing DNA exonerations
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013)
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
(documenting over 1000 exonerees, the majority of whom are minorities, from 1989 to present). An
additional 1100 people have been exonerated in groups (resulting from twelve major law
enforcement scandals). Samuel R. Gross & Michael Shaffer, Nat'l Registry Exonerations,
Exonerations in the United States, 1989 - 2012, at 80-90 (May 2012), http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations us 1989_2012_full report.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2013).
8. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically JustifiedFactual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) (estimating a 3 to 5%
wrongful conviction rate for capital rape-murders); see also Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One
Hundred Years Later. Wrongful Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 825, 832-36 (2010) (summarizing several studies).
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Instead the innocent-but-convicted person's plea for exoneration is,
as a matter of course, referred back to the very prosecutorial office that
convicted him in the first place. 9 He begs, in essence, for error
correction. His wrongful conviction is an unmitigated tragedy, but his
request for review creates an unmitigated conflict of interest, or so I
argue. That is, the same prosecutorial office that made the mistake is
being asked to evaluate and to turn against its own work. In this work, I
show not only the conflict in theory, which is the somewhat simple part,
but also the way in which the conflict has actually and negatively
affected the just treatment of wrongful conviction cases. As exposing
wrongful convictions has not miraculously cured the problem, however,
I labor under no misimpression that exposing this glaring conflict of
interest will miraculously cure this additional problem. My hope,
instead, is that the exposure will nudge forward some existing, effective,
and implementable solutions to the conflict.
Part II identifies and examines the conflict of interest. Part III
describes prosecutors' suboptimal reactions to, and review of, new
exculpatory evidence and post-conviction claims of innocence. Finally,
Part IV offers three ways to cure or mitigate the conflict, thereby
improving post-conviction review.
II.

THE CONFLICT: ATTACKING OR DEFENDING ONE'S OWN WORK

The prosecutor's personal "conviction" in obtaining a "conviction"
ordinarily is an asset to the prosecutor and the community-when the
prosecutor gets it right. When the prosecutor gets it wrong and,
consequently, an innocent (or at least a less-guilty) person is in prison,
however, the prosecutor will likely be asked to reconsider the
conviction.' ° When other lawyers are asked to turn against their own
work, they typically must tell the client to obtain another lawyer."1 Their
obligation to their former client-and to themselves-prohibits them
from pursuing the matter. 2 After a transactional attorney drafts a
9. An empirical study of these referrals does not accompany this brief Article; I therefore
must note that the process in the various jurisdictions may vary from my textual statement, which I
believe to be the norm in the first (and sometimes last) instance.
10. Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58
VAND. L. REV. 171, 179-81 (2005) [hereinafter Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors].
11. See Charles W. Wolfram, Former-ClientConflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 696-98
(1997).
12. Professor Charles W. Wolfram has wisely explained the rationale for the prohibition. In
addition to the possibility of inserting or exploiting weaknesses in the lawyer's own work for the
later benefit of another client (a situation unlikely in this context), several reasons support the
prohibition:
Lawyer's attack on her own work would deprive Client One[, the former client,] of
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contract, for example, she cannot later challenge the contract on behalf
of another client or herself. 13 Likewise, if a litigator achieves a
settlement or judgment, he ordinarily cannot later attack it on behalf of
another client or himself.14 In a similar vein, criminal defense (and other)
attorneys generally cannot represent clients when (1) the attorneys'
conduct or work product is in issue or (2) a significant incentive exists

significant value ...for which Client One paid Lawyer substantial fees. At the simple
level of fair exchanges, it would seem perverse and wasteful to permit Lawyer to destroy
the very value that Lawyer was paid to create. For reasons such as those, the
Restatement, agreeing with the decisions, independently and explicitly precludes later
adverse representation by a lawyer, even in the absence of a substantial relationship,
when the later representation would entail an attack on the lawyer's own work.
A reverse twist illustrates another possible aspect of the attack-own-work
prohibition. Client Two[, the current client,] also has a potential problem. Client Two,
after being fully informed, might conclude that it would be risky to retain Lawyer.
Successful attack would make Lawyer appear incompetent in the earlier representation,
or even treacherous. To avoid such an appearance, Lawyer may be less than diligent in
aiding Client Two.
Id. at 698 (footnotes omitted).
13. See, e.g., Exterior Sys., Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (N.D.
Ind. 2001) ("In simple terms, Attorney Gillard's current client is suing the successor to her former
client on a contract she created on behalf of her former client. This conflict, separate from any other
potential conflicts, is sufficient to warrant disqualification of Gillard."); Franklin v. Callum, 782
A.2d 884, 887 (N.H. 2001) ("[T]he defendants contend that Fulton is disqualified under Rules 1.9
and 1.10 because Gardner, as the Project's former counsel, drafted agreements forming the Project
and because the claims of her current client, the plaintiff, require the application and interpretation
of those agreements in litigation against the Project. We agree."); In re Taylor, 67 S.W.3d 530, 533
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002) ("Filer-the lawyer with the Naman firm who did the estate planning work,
prepared the agreement, and acknowledged that the firm represented Barbara-is disqualified from
representing any of the multiple parties to the agreement ... in a dispute among those clients in
regard to that matter."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNNG LAWYERS § 132(1) &

cmt. d(ii) (2000) (prohibiting attorneys from attacking their own prior work even if no confidential
information would be compromised in doing so).
14. See Sullivan Cnty. Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 758
(N.H. 1996) ("[E]ven in the absence of any confidences, an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to a
former client that prevents that attorney from attacking, or interpreting, work she performed, or
supervised, for the former client."); cf, e.g., Price v. Price, 733 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422-23 (App. Div.
2001). In Price,the court disqualified the entire firm because:
[t]he same firm charged with the obligation to protect plaintiff's interests in the
negotiations culminating in the signing of the prenuptial agreement will be put in the
untenable position of arguing that it abjectly failed in its efforts to protect those interests.
The material consideration is not the credibility of a particular lawyer but the general
reputation of the firm. No matter which member of the firm appears in the divorce action
on plaintiff's behalf, it will be necessary to attack the adequacy of the representation
provided to her during the course of negotiations in order to overcome the presumption
that her interests were protected.
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for the attorneys to soft-pedal the clients' claims
to avoid liability."
16
Prosecutors, however, are special in this regard.
When a prosecutor achieves a wrongful conviction, the prosecutor
will likely be asked later (1) to reevaluate that work objectively and (2)
15. See, e.g., United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding an
"actual conflict of interest" for a defense attorney to be put in a position in which his duty to his
current client, a criminal defendant, might require the attorney to challenge a conviction he had
previously obtained against the client while serving as a prosecutor). Similarly applicable situations
include representing clients in ineffective assistance of counsel claims involving the attorney's own
conduct and in civil or criminal matters while a bar complaint, legal malpractice claim, or criminal
investigation is ongoing. For example:
[a] court found that reversal of Mathis's conviction could expose Schofield[, his
attorney,] to liability for his part in the delay since Mathis would have spent years in
prison on an erroneous conviction; affirmance, on the other hand, would have served
Schofield's interest in avoiding discipline or damages, because it would have allowed the
conclusion that the delay, although egregious, had been harmless.
Mathis v. Hood, 937 F.2d 790, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming "the judgment of the district court
based on its conclusion that Mathis's attorney had an actual conflict of interest sufficient to
undermine its confidence in the outcome of the appeal, a conflict that established a per se violation
of Mathis's right to effective assistance of counsel"). In another circuit case, the court concluded
that, when a witness accused an attorney of criminal conduct:
[t]his created an actual conflict and likely affected [the attomey]'s performance in four
ways: he could not call himself as a witness to refute [the] accusations but his crossexamination included much of his own unsworn testimony, he cross-examined [the
witness] in an unseemly and emotional manner, he did not question [his client] about [the
witness's] accusation on direct, and he could not pursue a plea bargain that might
implicate himself.
Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 583 (9th Cir. 1988). In a final example, a court found that:
[a]s an alleged wrongdoer in the action, the accused had a strong interest in defending the
propriety of his conduct to protect his professional reputation. Additionally, although, as
the accused emphasizes, Fischer did not name the accused in his action against Tel-Ad,
the accused nevertheless also had a personal and financial interest in avoiding any
personal liability to Fischer for his actions as Fischer's supervisor.
In re Kluge, 66 P.3d 492, 499 (Or. 2003). To be sure, some of these conflicts may effectively be
cured if the attorney first obtains informed consent from all affected clients. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2012) ("[A] lawvyer may represent a client if... each
affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 122, 132; Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 (2005)
(concluding that, when the lawyer determines that the lawyer's own interests may materially limit
the representation, continued representation is permissible "only if the lawyer 'reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected' and the client consents after consultation").
16. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,
88 GEO. L.J. 207, 228-33 (2000) (noting that prosecutors have been permitted to behave differently
than other lawyers in several areas, including investigations, witness compensation, and conflicts of
interest). With respect to conflicts of interest in particular, the authors accurately observed:
Conventional bar association wisdom is that prosecutors and other government lawyers
have a greater obligation than other lawyers to avoid conflicts of interest. Government
lawyers may have a special obligation to 'avoid the appearance of impropriety' because
of the importance of preserving public trust in the operation of government. Yet, judicial
decisions apply conflict of interest rules less restrictively to prosecutors than to other
lawyers.
Id. at 233 (footnote omitted).
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to undo the conviction the prosecutor earlier secured. 17 Thus, if a
prosecutor followed the same rules as other lawyers, the prosecutorand colleagues otherwise involved in the conviction-presumably could
not undertake the matter.' 8 The prosecutor, however, is a "minister of
justice," and as such, she has no duties to any tangible former client
restraining her from reevaluating and challenging her previous work.' 9
17. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 496 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(h)) ("The ABA model rules suggest that, if the evidence of the defendant's
innocence is 'clear and convincing,' the prosecutor should make reasonable, affirmative efforts to
rectify the wrongful conviction.").
18. Perhaps there is some equality in what appears, at first blush, to be unequal duties. Private
attorneys (and also many other government lawyers) can seek informed consent to undertake the
representation notwithstanding the conflict. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4).
Prosecutors, in contrast, typically have no client from whom they could request informed consent.
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.1 (1986). Professor Wolfram noted:
The office of prosecutor can best be conceptualized as a lawyer with no client but
with several important constituencies.
The emotionally satisfying statement is that the client of every prosecutor is the
public. A less emotive but more realistic conceptualization is that prosecutors in a
position to make policy decisions should regard the public as their client, while
prosecutors in subordinate roles should regard their superiors in the office as the
effective client for matters on which office policy has been set or specific directions
given, unless a superior directs a subordinate lawyer to violate the law or the professional
rules.
Id. Without the typical notion of client, at least three options emerge: (1) discover and require a
substitute for informed client consent (e.g., informed consent from the division chief); (2) permit the
prosecutor to undertake the representation without any substitute; or (3) prohibit the representation.
Effectively adopting option (2), the drafters of the ethical rules have apparently solved the
conundrum by falling back on the "minister of justice" command; in other words, the prosecutor
needs no informed consent or the rough equivalent, but her conduct must always be in the interests
of justice. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1; NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS
Standard 8-1.8 & cmt. (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 2009); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3 & cmt. (1993).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of
a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, [and] that guilt is decided upon
the basis of sufficient evidence .... ); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The
Court in Bergernoted that prosecutors have special obligations as:
representative[s] not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.
Id. at 88. The National District Attorneys Association provides another example. See NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standards 1-1.1, 1-1.2. The National Prosecution Standards note that:
[U]nlike other lawyers, a prosecutor does not represent individuals or entities, but society
as a whole. In that capacity, the prosecutor must exercise independent judgment in
reaching decisions while taking into account the interest of victims, witnesses, law
enforcement officers, suspects, defendants and those members of society who have no
direct interest in a particular case, but who are nonetheless affected by its outcome.
Id. Standard 1 cmt.
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Justice, at least in theory, is flexible enough to work backward. "Justice"
is always the prosecutor's (means and) ends, and if justice now calls for
the opposite result (e.g., an exoneration), the prosecutor must pursue it.
To the extent that anyone in practice has even analyzed the issue under
the ethical rules, this is apparently where the analysis stopped. But the
preceding analysis has missed the crux of the conflicts problem.
The serious conflict is between justice and the prosecutor's personal
interest. The prosecutor has an interest, however subconscious or shortsighted, in not attacking her previous work product. She (and her office)
spent months or years advocating positions and filing documents seeking
to secure the person's conviction. It creates a significant conflict of
interest to ask that prosecutor, and arguably even that office, to undo it.20
The American Bar Association (the "ABA") Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules")2 have been generally clear on
this point: "[A] conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that
a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate
course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. 22 Similarly, "[t]he lawyer's
own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on
representation of a client., 23 The Model Rules get even clearer: "[I]f the
probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question,
it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached
advice. '24 The former client conflicts rules also analogously prohibit a
20. See, e.g., Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors, supra note 10, at 218. Professor Fred C.
Zacharias wrote:
Postconviction justice issues can raise several types of conflicts that are different in
nature than standard trial-level conflicts among multiple constituencies. First, when new
information calls a previous conviction into question, a prosecutor's personal interests
are often implicated. If the prosecutor was involved in the prior trial, she has an interest
in protecting her track record and reputation.
Id. (footnote omitted); cf Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal
Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 75-76 (2009) (noting the "direct clash between duty and selfinterest" when a "defense lawyer has been accused of ineffective assistance of counsel and is called
upon to testify about decisions made during representation").
21.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2012).

22. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
23. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 10. Model Rule 1.7(a)(2), which is essentially in place in virtually every
state, prohibits all representations in which a lawyer's actions would be "materially limited" by the
lawyer's own interests. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2); see Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules,
A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/model -rulesof professionalconduct/alpha list state adopting modelrules.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). In
certain situations, however, the lawyer can effectively cure the conflict by seeking informed consent
from the applicable client(s). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10. A fortiori,a prosecutor accused of a
non-frivolous claim of prosecutorial misconduct should not be in charge of investigating and
evaluating that claim. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Post-Conviction Death Penalty Investigations:
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prosecutor's change in direction: "a lawyer ...who has prosecuted an
accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent
''25
civil action against the government concerning the same transaction.
As with other lawyers, these Model Rules generally bind the
prosecutor: "Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer
currently serving as a public officer or employee ...is subject to" the
conflict rules. 26
27
Case law, in addition, prohibits the conflicts by analogy. A

prosecutor-turned-criminal-defense attorney cannot later attack a
conviction s/he obtained: "[T]he lawyer's attack on his or her own work
will be suspiciously under-motivated, for obvious reasons of
professional pride in having acted competently to obtain the conviction
in the first instance. '' 5
Moreover, although not black-letter ethical prohibitions, national
ethical guidelines have been designed specifically for prosecutors. The
ABA, for example, has developed standards governing the prosecution
function, and those standards caution against personal interest conflicts
of interest. 29 Furthermore, the National District Attorneys Association
(the "NDAA"), "the oldest and largest organization representing
criminal prosecutors in the world," has its own standards, which tell the
prosecutor to "excuse himself or herself from any investigation,
prosecution, or other matter where personal interests of the prosecutor
would cause a fair-minded, objective observer to conclude that the
prosecutor's neutrality, judgment, or ability to administer the law in an
objective manner may be compromised. 30 Although this standard
The Needfor IndependentInvestigators, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REV. S225, S246-47 (2011).
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 1; see also Allied Realty of St. Paul, Inc.
v. Exch. Nat'l Bank of Chi., 408 F.2d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1969) (disqualifying former federal
prosecutor from later representing plaintiffs in a matter that he had investigated while he was still a
prosecutor). This authority is only analogous, however, because ordinarily the prosecutor has not
switched employment; thus the prosecutor's client, in a general sense, remains arguably the same.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (d) (referring the prosecutor to Model Rules
1.7 and 1.9). Imputed disqualification of the other prosecutors in the same office, however, is not the
norm. See, e.g., id. R. 1.11 cmt. 2 ("Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a
does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an
government agency, [the rule]
officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees,
although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.").
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 940-41 (1989).
28. Wolfram, supranote 11, at 699-700 (citing Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d at 940-41).
29. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3(a)
(1993) ("A prosecutor should avoid a conflict of interest with respect to his or her official duties.");
id. Standard 3-1.3(f) ("A prosecutor should not permit his or her professional judgment or
obligations to be affected by his or her own political, financial, business, property, or personal
interests."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 8, 10 ("The lawyer's own
interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.").
30. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1-3.3(d) (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 2009);
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designedly does not permit precise, universal application, a "fairminded, objective observer" would at least take serious issue with our
current system. That system presumes that the very person or office
committing the prejudicial error of convicting and imprisoning an
innocent person will fairly reevaluate and then seek to overturn its own
error. 31 Absent some procedural protections (as proposed below), the
objective observer would much more likely conclude that the prosecutor
should recuse herself from the review.
This all makes sense--on paper. Prosecutors are not even permitted
to proceed in cases in which a relative will be the opposing lawyer or an
important witness or a relative's conduct will be in issue. 32 Prosecutors'33
own conduct, then, presents an even more "material limitation.,

NDAA's Mission, NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, http://www.ndaa.org/ndaamission.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2013). This recusal standard is very similar to the standard for judges. See, e.g.,
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) ("Quite simply and quite universally, recusal [is]
required whenever 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'); Keith Swisher, ProProsecution Judges: "Tough on Crime," Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification,52 ARIZ. L.
REv. 317, 357-58 (2010).
31. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 1, at 405 (quoting Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors,
supra note 10, at 174, 218-19) ("[R]eexamining a conviction 'may involve confronting a
prosecutor's own error or undermining the reputation of a colleague who erred.' A prosecutor may
be particularly reluctant to raise questions when the 'new information reflects prior prosecutorial
misconduct,' could hurt the office politically, or engender a lawsuit." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Steven A. Krieger, Why Our Justice System Convicts Innocent People, and the Challenges Faced by
Innocence Projects Trying to Exonerate Them, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 333, 350 (2011) ("[T]he
current prosecutor may be the same individual who 'successfully' convicted the defendant initially.
We cannot expect the prosecutors to instantly change their minds, as this would require some degree
of admission of fault pertaining to the original prosecution, and no one is particularly good at
admitting mistakes." (footnote omitted)).
32. See, e.g., People v. Doyle, 406 N.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1-3.3(c); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION

FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3(g); see also State Bar of Arizona Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct,
Formal Op. 01-12 (2001) ("Where [a public defender and a law enforcement officer are in an
intimate relationship and] are both involved in a case, and the Officer is expected to testify, in most,
ifnot all, cases a non-waivable conflict will exist."). Standard 3-1.3(g) of the Standards for
CriminalJustice: ProsecutionFunction states:
A prosecutor who is related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse should
not participate in the prosecution of a person who the prosecutor knows is represented by
the other lawyer. Nor should a prosecutor who has a significant personal or financial
relationship with another lawyer participate in the prosecution of a person who the
prosecutor knows is represented by the other lawyer, unless the prosecutor's supervisor,
if any, is informed and approves or unless there is no other prosecutor authorized to act
in the prosecutor's stead.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3(g).
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7; cf United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548,
552-53 (9th Cir. 1985) (disqualifying prosecutor because his involvement in the underlying issues

made him a material witness and questioning his ability to remain and appear objective in such
circumstances). Psychologically, it is difficult for attorneys to identify and evaluate their conflicts
objectively. For instance, Professor Tigran W. Eldred noted that:
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Prosecutors who ignore this conflict of interest-and particularly
prosecutors whose conduct is or will be in issue in a habeas petition or
34
civil rights action-should face disqualification motions.
The office, as well, hired that prosecutor, supported that conviction,

and, at the top, has a head who presumably would rather not admit that
prejudicial error. An office, moreover, is essentially a collective of,
hopefully, cooperating and collegial individuals. Thus, assigning the

case to the prosecutor's colleague down the hall will only attenuate, not
eliminate, the conflict. 35 That colleague is part of the collective-the
"office"-and will be resistant, both consciously and subconsciously, to

embarrass or attack the public work of the office or the individual

[R]esearch demonstrates that, just as cognitive heuristics and biases systematically cause
deviations from full rationality, so too a set of motivations causes systematic deviations
from full ethicality and professional responsibility when conflicts of interest are present.
Professionals often believe falsely that they will not be corrupted by conflicts of interest,
yet in reality they are subject to the same unconscious biases toward self-interest and
self-worth as everyone else. The results are errors in judgment, both in predicting
whether conflicting interests will have an influence on decisions and when reflecting
upon whether a conflict influenced decisions previously made. Like all cognitive biases,
these errors occur below the level of consciousness, invisibly infecting the decisionmaking process but leaving no trail.
Eldred, supra note 20, at 67-72 (footnotes omitted).
34. See United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1275-77 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Given the need to
promote the appearance of justice, a trial court on timely motion should disqualify a prosecutor from
participating in a criminal action when he has a personal conflicting interest in a civil case."); cf
Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that courts should scrutinize
"whether the attorney will, in the present case, be required to undermine, criticize, or attack his or
her own work product from the previous case"); United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 94041 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting the "actual conflict of interest" when a defense attorney might need to
challenge a conviction he had previously obtained as a prosecutor); Prantil, 764 F.2d at 552-53
(disqualifying prosecutor because his involvement in the underlying issues made him a material
witness and questioning his ability to remain and appear objective in such circumstances).
35. Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutoras Minister of Justice: Preachingto the Unconverted
from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 51-53 (2009) [hereinafter Medwed, The
Prosecutoras Minister ofJustice]. In particular, Professor Daniel S. Medwed noted:
Even when petitions are distributed to other lawyers in the office, the status quo bias
probably persists. Studies show that individuals within the same profession or
organization frequently respect the decisions of their cohorts due to the power of
"conformity effects," a desire to act in line with a peer. A person may be particularly
reluctant to alter a colleague's decision where that colleague had access to greater
information at the time of the preceding decision.
Id. at 53 (footnote omitted). Professors Green and Yaroshefsky similarly observed:
A prosecutor will tend to view a conviction as a confirmation that his initial charging
decision was correct and will naturally discount new evidence of innocence. These
tendencies will be most pronounced for the particular prosecutors who had responsibility
for investigating and trying a case, but it will also inhere in the district attorney or other
prosecutor in charge of the office that obtained the conviction, in its supervisory
prosecutors, and in others who identify with the office and its work.
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 489-90.
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prosecutor.36 Thus, although the ordinary rules of imputation do
not apply to prosecutorial offices, and although the conflict is less
intense, a personal conflict may reside in many or all prosecutors in the
same office.
Notwithstanding these on-paper conflicts, the discussion to this
point has been relatively abstract-both in that prosecutors rarely seem
to follow these rules as written and in that I have raised relatively few
specific examples of the conflict. Below I cite several vivid examples
that might show, at least speculatively, that these conflicts of interest are
actually prejudicing the quest for justice.
III.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICTS: DENY,
DEFEND, DEFY, AND DEVOLVE

My recent journey into the minds, or at least the rhetoric, of certain
prosecutors has perhaps revealed some evidence of these conflicts in
action. To be sure, much of the evidence below is circumstantial. But if
even half of it is accurately descriptive-and I would assume at least half
of it is because the evidence primarily comes straight from top
prosecutors' mouths-it is cause for restructuring prosecutorial offices to
avoid or mitigate the conflicts outlined above.
Following the adoption of the Model Rules nearly thirty years ago,
the Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 37 governing prosecutors has
remained virtually identical to the corresponding Model Rule.3" In 2008,
however, the ABA adopted a significant amendment to the Model Rule
(the "Amendment").3 9 This critical Amendment, in short, gives guidance
36. See, e.g., Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors,supra note 10, at 218. Professor Zacharias
wrote:
Even if [the prosecutor] was not involved [in securing the conviction], questioning the
prior conviction may damage her relationship with a colleague (or former colleague) who
was involved or friends of that colleague, particularly when new information reflects
prior prosecutorial misconduct. She must also protect her relationship with her
supervisors, who may have an interest in avoiding adverse public reaction if the new
information is revealed; postconviction issues tend to be highly publicized and can affect
a district attorney's hopes for reelection.
Id. (footnote omitted).
37. ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2010) (codified at AuZ. SUP. CT. R. 42).
38. See ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 42. Compare ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT ER 3.8, with
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007), and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8
(2006), and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2005).
39. See Stephen J. Saltzburg, Report to the House of Delegates, 2008 A.B.A. SEC.
CRtM. JUST. REP. 105B, at 1-2, availableat http://www.americanbar.org/content/dami/aba/migrated/
leadership/2008/midyear/sum of rec docs/hundredfiveb 105BFINAL.doc; see also Daniel S.
Medwed, ProsecutorialEthics in the Postconviction Settingfrom A to Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 331, 333-34 (2011) [hereinafter Medwed, Prosecutorial Ethics] (discussing the 2008
Amendment to Model Rule 3.8).
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to prosecutors in discharging their ethical responsibilities when they
learn of new and probative evidence that an innocent person has likely
been wrongfully convicted.4 ° In particular, it requires prosecutors to
disclose to the court and the defendant "new, credible and material
evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did
not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted" and to
"undertake further investigation."' 1 Furthermore, "[w]hen a prosecutor
knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in
the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the
defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the
conviction. 42 Because prosecutors had little post-conviction ethical
guidance before this Amendment, because wrongful convictions are
damning marks on the criminal justice system, and because the
Amendment requires action only in rare cases, 43 one might not expect
major resistance to incorporating this important Amendment into
Arizona law. One would be wrong.
Along with Larry Hammond and Karen Wilkinson, 4 I drafted and
submitted a petition to the Arizona Supreme Court, formally asking it to
adopt the ABA's Amendment. 45 Once a petitioner submits such a rule40. See Saltzburg, supranote 39, at 4-6.
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (2012).
42. Id. R. 3.8(h).
43. The Amendment's standard for action is very high. The standard not only requires
"knowledge" of "new, credible and material evidence" (each defined terms) but also requires that
such evidence create a reasonable "likelihood" that the person is actually innocent of the offense.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 1.0(f), 3.8(g); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at
471-72 (noting that this high standard for action sets only a "bare minimum" and suggesting that
prosecutors should go above and beyond it). I thank Professors Green and Yaroshefsky, two of the
chief architects of the Amendment in both the ABA and New York, for their input, from which the
petition and this work benefitted appreciably.
44. Larry Hammond is a longtime criminal practitioner, adjunct professor, and founder of the
Arizona Justice Project, and Karen Wilkinson is an assistant federal public defender for the District
of Arizona. Justice Project Founder Larry Hammond Receives the Morris Dees Justice Award,
2 JUST. PROJECT Q., no. 2, at 6, 6 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.azjusticeproject.org/
newsletters/jpquarterlyv2i2.pdf
45. See Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, No. R-110033 (Ariz. Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/aacc/appella/
ASC%5CR%5CR1 10033.pdf. Largely through Mark Harrison's efforts, three retired chief justices
of the Arizona Supreme Court, two former Arizona attorneys general, and one prominent retired
trial court judge filed a public comment in support of the petition and the Amendment. See
Comment of Lawyers in Support of Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of the Arizona Rules of Professional
Conduct, In re Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of the Ariz. Rules of Prof'l Conduct (Rule 42 of the Ariz.
Rules of Supreme Court), No. R-1 1-0033 (Ariz. May 4, 2012) [hereinafter Comment of Lawyers in
Support of Petition], available at http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/0/NTForumsAttach/
154533830471.pdf. The petition also provoked, however, opposing comments from the Department
of Justice and the largest state prosecutorial offices and organizations. See Arizona Prosecuting
Attorneys' Advisory Council's Comments to Petition to Amend Arizona E.R. 3.8, Rule 42, Rules of
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change petition, the Arizona Supreme Court generally opens up a public
comment period for several months. 46 This is where the conflicts can be
seen, or so I suggest. I have identified several prosecutorial arguments
contained in publicly filed opposing comments, and related reactions,
that suggest (but do not necessarily prove) that the conflicts of interest
identified above affect prosecutors.4 7 These four arguments are: (A) a
belief that no problems exist in prosecutors' pre- and post-conviction
treatment and review of evidence; (B) a fear of civil liability for
reviewing and investigating wrongful conviction claims; (C) a belief that
prosecutors cannot or should not be regulated in this area; and (D) a
belief that defendants, not necessarily prosecutors, should seek justice
post-conviction. These arguments are addressed in order below.
A.

The Perfect Prosecutor:Avoiding Mistakes by Denying Them

In reaction to the proposed Amendment, several prosecutorial
offices took the debunked position that no problems exist in Arizona.48
the Supreme Court at 2, In re Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of the Ariz. Rules of Prof'1 Conduct (Rule
42 of the Ariz. Rules of Supreme Court) [hereinafter APAAC's Comments to Petition], availableat
http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/0/NTForumsAttach/1521395889729.pdf; Comment of the Pima
County Attorney at 1, In re Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of the Ariz. Rules of Prof'1 Conduct (Rule 42
of the Ariz. Rules of Supreme Court), No. R-11-0033 (Ariz. May 21, 2012), available at
http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/O/NTForums Attach/1521355799229.pdf; Comments of the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the District of Arizona at 1-2, In re Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of the Ariz.
Rules of Prof'l Conduct (Rule 42 of the Ariz. Rules of Supreme Court), No. R- 11-0033 (Ariz.May
20, 2012) [hereinafter Comments of the USAO], available at http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/
Portals/0/NTForums Attach/1 520143461871 .pdf.
46. See ARIz. SuP. CT. R. 28 (detailing the procedure to petition for new ethical and
other rules).
47. On a broader scale, Professor Green has recently been through a similar journey in
prosecutorial rhetoric and resistance, and he has persuasively written about it-and its
implications-in a very recent article. See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorsand Professional
Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873 (2012) ("To the extent that prosecutors' inflammatory
anti-regulation rhetoric reflects genuine belief, it seems likely that the belief is atavistic, vestigial,
unexamined, and shaped by the continued utility of exaggerated rhetoric as an advocacy tool."). He
notes, among other interesting predictions, that unnecessary resistance might lead to a prosecutorial
culture dangerously dismissive of ethical regulation and might also lead to a loss of credibility. See
id. at 902-03. Somewhat similarly, in Arizona's ongoing experiment in evolving ethical regulation
of prosecutors, not only have some prosecutorial offices advanced virtually every conceivable
argument against change, they have often set their arguments in general or vague language without
citations to legal authority. See, e.g., APAAC's Comment to Petition, supra note 45, at 3 (asserting
separation of powers concerns without a single supportive citation); Comment of the Pima County
Attorney, at 2-3 (asserting vagueness, immunity, burden, and so on, with only a single citation in the
entire comment).
48. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments in Opposition of Adopting ABA's Amendments to
Model Rule 3.8 at 3, In re Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of the Ariz. Rules of Prof'l Conduct (Rule 42
of the Ariz. Rules of Supreme Court), No. R-1 1-0033 (Ariz. June 30, 2012) [hereinafter Reply to
Prosecutors' Comments], available at http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/0/NTForums Attach/
173233644554.pdf; see APAAC's Comment to Petition, supra note 45, at 2 ("First and foremost,
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Other prosecutorial offices took similar positions when opposing the
Amendment in other states. 49 Arizona indeed contains many excellent
prosecutors. But even if Arizona is generally better than other states in
this and related respects, which is an empirically untested proposition,
"ministers of justice" should still welcome ethical guidance in this area;
they currently have almost none. 50 Furthermore, Arizona is actually not

there is simply no evidence that Arizona prosecutors fail to disclose post-conviction information that
could have changed the outcome of a case."); Maricopa County Attorney's Comments to Petition to
Amend ER 3.8, Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct at 3, 5-6, In re Petition to Amend ER 3.8 of
the Ariz. Rules of Prof I Conduct (Rule 42 of the Ariz. Rules of Supreme Court), No. R-1 1-0033
(Ariz. May 18, 2012) [hereinafter Maricopa County Attorney's Comments], available at
http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/0/NTForumsAttach/152125143012.pdf ("The Krone case proves
that prosecutors will act appropriately when newly discovered evidence shows a convicted
defendant did not commit the crime."). The Petition, Reply, and all of the opposing comments are
available on the Arizona Supreme Court's Rules Forum. See Court Rules Forum: Subject:
R-11-0033 Petition to Amend ER 3.8, Rule 42, Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, ARIZ.
SUPREME COURT, http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/AZSupremeCourtMain/AZCourtRulesMain/CourtRules
ForumMain/CourtRuiesForum/tabid/9l/view/topic/forumid/7/postid/l530[/Default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 7, 2013).
49. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Attorney, W. Dist. of Wash., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Wash. 2 (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court Rules/proposed/201ODe/RPC3.8US%2Department20fD/o2OJu
stice.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Washington State U.S. Attorney] (arguing, on behalf of
the U.S. Department of Justice, that the problems lacked evidence); Memorandum from Karen L.
Loeffler, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Alaska, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Deborah O'Regan, Exec. Dir.,
Alaska Bar Ass'n 2 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://alaskabar.org/servlet/download?id=1572 [hereinafter
Memorandum from Alaska U.S. Attorney] (arguing, on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice,
that the problems lacked evidence); Memorandum from Florence T. Nakakuni, U.S. Attorney, Dist.
of Haw., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Honorable Justices of the Haw. Supreme Court 11, 18 (Oct. 3.
2011), http://hsba.org/resources/l/HRPC/FINAL/Comment%20from%20US%20Attomey-District
%20of/o20Hawaii.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Hawaii U.S. Attorney] (arguing, on behalf of
the U.S. Department of Justice, that the problems lacked evidence). See generally Testimony of
Scott Burns, Executive Director, National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) (July 18, 2012),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-7-18BurnsTestimony.pdf (claiming that prosecutors have
only a one-ten-thousandth-of-one-percent error rate).
50. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 3. The prosecutorial offices claimed
that the Arizona Supreme Court had already given them sufficient guidance through one passing
sentence. See Comments of the USAO, supra note 45, at 2-3; Maricopa County Attorney's
Comments, supranote 48, at 3; see also Memorandum from Andr6 Birotte, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Cent.
Dist. of Cal., Laura E. Duffy, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of Cal., Joseph P. Russoniello, N. Dist. of Cal.
& Benjamin B. Wagner, U.S. Attorney, E. Dist. of Cal., to Bd. Of Governors, State Bar of Cal. 7
14, 2010), http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-iF6nQZSKO5A%3D&
(June
tabid=2161 [hereinafter Memorandum from California U.S. Attorneys] (arguing that existing rules
and regulations conflict with the amendment). But as we noted in our filings:
[T]he entire discussion ... consists of the following sentence: "The Court of Appeals
found, and the State acknowledges, an ethical and constitutional obligation to disclose
clearly exculpatory material that comes to its attention after the sentencing has occurred,
see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (setting forth requirement to disclose clearly
exculpatory material), and we affirm that the State does bear such a duty."
Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 8 (quoting in part Canion v. Cole, 115 P.3d
1261, 1262 (Ariz. 2005)). The court then went on to distinguish the issue. Reply to Prosecutors'
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perfect. Although the point of the Amendment is not to react to a
problem peculiar to Arizona (rather, it is a documented problem in every
state), of course Arizona has problems. Both the fact that top prosecutors
do not believe that problems exist and the example problems I list below
show a conflict between their duty to justice and their (sometimes
subconscious) duty to themselves and their offices.
If no problems actually exist in practice, we can hardly fault
prosecutors for failing to worry or change. But problems exist at every
level. "First, a recent study of Arizona appellate opinions between just
2004 and 2008 revealed [twenty] cases of prosecutorial misconduct. 5 1
Comments, supra note 48, at 8;see Canion, 115 P.3d at 1262-63. The prosecutorial offices also
cited Thomas v. Goldsmith, whose:
entire relevant discussion ... is contained in a few general sentences: "[W]e believe the
state is under an obligation to come forward with any exculpatory semen evidence in its
possession. We do not refer to the state's past duty to turn over exculpatory evidence at
trial, but to its present duty to turn over exculpatory evidence relevant to the instant
habeas corpus proceeding."
Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 8-9 (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, as the court
noted, the petitioner in Thomas knew what evidence might exculpate him and specifically requested
it from both the state and court. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 8-9; see
Goldsmith, 979 F.2d at 749. Many potential exonerees, however, do not know the specific nature of
the potentially exculpating evidence. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 9. See
generally KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009, at 36-37 (2010), available at
http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct-BookEntire-online%20version.pdf.
PreventableErrorreports:
It is impossible to know how many Brady violations occur-by their nature they involve
evidence that is hidden from the defense. But a study of all 5,760 capital convictions in
the United States from 1973 to 1995 found that the suppression of evidence by
prosecutors was responsible for 16 percent of reversals at the state post-conviction stage.
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra, at 37 (citing James S. Liebman et al., CapitalAttrition: ErrorRates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1839, 1846, 1850 (2000)). Finally, the opposing
comments also failed to mention that the Supreme Court has subsequently limited Goldsmith's
holding. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 9; see Stewart v. Cate, No. 05cvl059BTM,2010 WL 1687671, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2010) (citing Dist. Attorney's Office for the
Third Judicial Circuit v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67-69 (2009)) ("[T]he holding in Goldsmith that
Brady applied in such a situation was specifically rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Osborne.").
51. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 4; ProsecutorialOversight Forum:
Court Findings of ProsecutorialError and Misconduct in Arizona 2004-2008, PROSECUTORIAL
OVERSIGHT, http://www.prosecutorialoversight.org/about-the-issue/court-findings-of-prosecutorialerror-and-misconduct-in-arizona-2004-2008 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013); Maurice Possley,
Viewpoints: Prosecutorial Conduct Exposed in Arizona, CRIME REP. (Apr. 26, 2012, 4:19 AM),
http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2012-04-prosecutorial-conduct-exposed-in-arizona.
Moreover, the study relied on only appellate opinions, which grossly understate the error
rate. See ProsecutorialOversight Forum, supra. In addition, PreventableError notes:
About 97 percent of felony criminal cases are resolved without trial, almost all through
guilty pleas. Moreover, findings of misconduct at the trial court level that are not
reflected in appellate opinions cannot be systematically reviewed without searching
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Consistent with this evidence, national studies disprove the notion that
prosecutors (unlike other humans) act perfectly. The most common
causal factors that appear in all exonerations include perjury or false
accusation (51%) and official misconduct (42%), and "[t]he most
is concealing exculpatory
common serious form of official misconduct
52
court.,
the
and
defendant
the
from
evidence
Second, Arizona has been the source of several specific examples
of both prosecutorial misconduct and egregious error, both pre- and postconviction. 53 The top prosecutor in Phoenix, the Maricopa County
Attorney, nevertheless suggested that prosecutors already act without
error in post-conviction settings. The only particular evidence proffered
to prove that fact, however, was the high-profile case of Ray Krone; the
Maricopa County Attorney argued that his office had commendably
addressed Krone's post-conviction case. 54 The County Attorney also
every case file in every courthouse in the state. And of course, the number cannot capture
cases of prosecutorial misconduct that were never discovered (for example, failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence) or appealed (due, for example, to lack of resources or
ineffective counsel).
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 50, at 2-3 (footnote omitted); see also SAMUEL R. GROSS &
MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,

1989-2012, at 67 (2012), availableat http://www.law.umich.edu/speciaUexoneration/Documents/
exonerations us 1989_2012_full report.pdf ("Misbehavior is rarely advertised. If misconduct is not
uncovered in litigation or by journalists, we don't know about it. As a result, our data underestimate
the frequency of official misconduct ...").
52. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 5; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 50,
at 40, 65-66. "It should be noted that official misconduct includes police misconduct, in addition to
prosecutorial misconduct." Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 5 n.8; see GROSS &
SHAFFER, supra note 51, at 40, 66-67. It should also be noted that the term "prosecutorial
misconduct" is arguably overused. ABA House of Delegates Resolution 100B (Aug. 9-10, 2010),
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/10Ob.authcheckdam.p
df (urging states to adopt the terminology of "error" to describe unintentional violations of criminal
defendants' rights and "misconduct" to describe intentional violations).
53. See, e.g., In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 772-73, 779 (Ariz. 2004) (disbarring prosecutor
because he permitted false testimony in a capital prosecution); Maurice Possley, Carolyn June Peak,
NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetai.
aspx?caseid=3528 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (documenting a dismissed murder charge because the
original prosecutor in the case had failed to turn over to the defense "more than 30 witness
interviews, more than two dozen investigative reports as well as records of subpoenas issued by
[that prosecutor]"); see also infra note 62 (discussing the recent disbarment of the former Maricopa
County Attorney and two top deputy prosecutors).
54. See Maricopa County Attorney's Comments, supranote 48, at 5 ("The Krone case proves
that prosecutors will act appropriately when newly discovered evidence shows a convicted
defendant did not commit the crime."); id. ("Upon receiving this evidence, the State moved in April
2002 to dismiss the charges with prejudice and release Krone from custody."); id. at 7 ("The Krone
case is proof that prosecutors do take appropriate action."). Krone had been branded "The
Snaggletooth Killer," whose crooked teeth formed the prosecution's primary evidence against him.
See State v. Krone, 897 P.2d 621, 622, 624 (Ariz. 1995); Jack Chin, Extreme Makeoverfor "The
Snaggletooth Killer," CRIMPROF BLOG (Nov. 19, 2004), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
crimprof blog/2004/l1/extreme makeove.html. The prosecution claimed that Krone's teeth
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later suggested that prosecutors have only a one-ten-thousandth-of-onepercent error rate.55 These arguments were alarming for at least two
reasons: (1) the arguments revealed a troubling logical fallacy: that
because the office did it right once, it has done and will do it right every
time; and (2) the arguments were wrong: The office had strongly
opposed DNA testing in Krone's case. 56 After the county attorney's
office lost that unnecessary opposition (but succeeded in significantly
delaying Krone's release from prison), moreover, the office took six
additional weeks to allow the innocent Krone a conditional release from
prison and two months to move to vacate the conviction.57 Furthermore,
"by that time the press had already started asking questions about
Krone's innocence, which might have increased the attention and speed
58
with which the [county attorney's office] treated the matter.,
Third, unique problems persist in post-conviction settings. For
example, an "analysis of 182 cases in which prosecutors could consent to
a motion to vacate convictions following DNA exoneration revealed that

matched a bite mark on the victim. See Krone, 897 P.2d at 622. Krone spent years in prison
(including death row) for a murder he did not commit, while the actual murderer remained free to
commit additional crimes. See Chin, supra. Krone was evidentially freed, becoming the 100th DNA
exoneree and a guest on Extreme Makeover. See Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 100th
Death Row Exoneree Freed in Arizona: DNA Evidence Vindicates Man Wrongfully Convicted of
1991 Murder (Apr. 9, 2002), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/518; Chin, supra. Today,
among other things, he speaks nationally about his nightmarish experiences with our criminal justice
system. See Ray Krone, WITNESS TO INNOCENCE, http://witnesstoinnocence.org/view_
stories.php?Ray-Krone-23 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
55. Bill Montgomery, ER 3.8 Amendment: Prosecutor Position, ARIZ. ATT'Y, April 2013
(forthcoming) (citing Testimony of Scott Bums, Executive Director, National District Attorneys
Association (NDAA) (July 18, 2012), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-7-18Bums
Testimony.pdf).
56. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 7 & n.13. The opposition overstated
the existing evidence and unnecessarily resisted DNA testing. See Response to Petition for DNA
Testing, State v. Krone, No. CR 92-00212 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001), available at
http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/0/NTForums Attach/I 73233646158.pdf (arguing that "the
evidence strongly supports the jury's finding of guilt," "[n]one of the scientific methods used to
analyze the evidence in this case have been found invalid or unreliable," "the nature of the
evidence ... does not 'make testing results on the issue of identity virtually dispositive,"' and the
evidence might not be "in a condition which would allow for DNA testing").
57. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 7; see Minute Entry at 1-2, State v.
Krone, No. CR 1992-000212 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 12, 2001), available at
http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/072001/m0368508.pdf; Minute Entry at 1-2,
State v. Krone, No. CR 1992-000212 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/042002/m0604448.pdf.
58. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 7; see, e.g., Beth DeFalco, DNA May
Free 1st Arizonan Inmate Convicted Twice in Murder, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 5, 2002, at Al; Beth
DeFalco, Doubts Plagued Trials in '91 Killings, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 2002, at B1; Beth
DeFalco, Hearing Set on DNA Evidence Convicted Man Remains in Prison, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr.
6, 2002, at B 1.
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12% did not consent."5 9 Moreover, "almost 20% of prosecutors initially
opposed DNA testing., 60 Indeed, all arguments plus the kitchen sink
have been raised to attempt to stop DNA and other post-conviction
testing. 61 Although some prosecutors intentionally cross the line of
reason,62 largely subconscious biases likely influence or cause these

59. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 6 (citing BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 230 (2011) [hereinafler
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT]); see also Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double
Helix, Double Bind: FactualInnocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547,
557-60 (2002) (recounting prosecutors' positive and negative attitudes toward DNA testing). See
generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, DATA ON HOW EXONEREES OBTAINED DNA TESTING
[hereinafter GARRETT, ExONEREES DATA], available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/
faculty/garrett/judginginnocence/exonereespostconviction dna testing.pdf) (identifying each
exoneree against whom prosecutors opposed a motion to vacate the conviction). Although 12% is
not necessarily horrible, it does show a problem in prosecutors' post-conviction behavior in a
significant number of cases; a problem not even acknowledged in the opposing comments. Reply to
Prosecutors' Comments, supranote 48, at 6 n.9.
60. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 6; GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT, supra note 59, at 227. See generally GARRETT, EXONEREES DATA, supra note 59
(identifying each exoneree against whom prosecutors opposed postconviction DNA testing).
61. The arguments range from expected to shocking:
Prosecutors have sought to narrowly constrain the availability of postconviction
DNA testing, citing financial concerns, the need for finality in the criminal justice
system, the need to protect the system of plea bargaining, and the specter of a wave of
frivolous requests.
Resistance to DNA testing is sometimes couched in sporting metaphors or grounded
in an unshakable belief in the accuracy of the guilty verdict. Prosecutors have attempted
to induce defendants to waive their rights to the maintenance of DNA evidence and have
sought to destroy DNA evidence that might exonerate incarcerated defendants.
While many prosecutors who refuse testing may be sincerely concerned with
administrative issues or finality, other factors may color some decisions. DNA
exonerations have disclosed deliberate (and in some cases criminal) police and
prosecutorial misconduct in obtaining the tainted convictions. Further, to the extent that
DNA exonerations reveal systemic flaws in the criminal justice system (e.g., faulty
eyewitness identifications, false confessions, ineffective defense counsel, and unethical
police or prosecutors), some prosecutors may believe that exonerations undermine the
credibility of the system. The State of Virginia has opposed making DNA evidence
available for testing that might exonerate two men the State has already executed .... [I]f
the testing proved exculpatory, argued the prosecutor, it "would be shouted from the
rooftops that the [C]ommonwealth of Virginia [had] executed an innocent man."
Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 59, at 561-64 (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).
62. For example, few would forget the Duke Lacrosse case, in which the prosecutor
convinced the lab to provide an incomplete report leaving out results excluding the accused players
and then maintained to the court that the incomplete report was actually complete. See Aronson &
McMurtrie, supra note 1,at 1474-75. Arizona was recently in the spotlight for arguably analogous
misconduct. Our former Maricopa County Attorney, Andrew Thomas, and two of his go-to deputies
prosecuted frivolous criminal and civil cases against judges and county officials. See, e.g., Terry
Carter, The Prosecutor on Trial: Ex-Maricopa County Attorney Faces Disbarmentfor Political
Acts, A.B.A. J., April 2012.
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sometimes-frivolous reactions. 63
Even after the post-conviction testing reveals that the defendant
likely did not commit the crime, some prosecutors shift their theory of
the crime to render the test result consistent with guilt. The mind can be
a dangerous thing. It is hard to square the exculpatory test results with
the prosecutor's firm belief in guilt; the mind pushes for new theories to
harmonize this inconsistency. These new theories can be, charitably,
outlandish:
Illinois prosecutor, Michael Mermel, has on at least three occasions
pursued an original conviction for rape after the DNA excluded the
accused. In two such cases, the victims were young children and the
alternative explanations for the presence of semen in their bodies
offered by Mermel were disturbing. In one case, Mermel suggested that
the eleven-year-old was sexually active; in another, he suggested that
the semen, which did not match the accused, may have entered an
eight-year-old's body as she played in the woods where ... she was

later found and where the prosecutor claimed some couples go to
have sex.64
Other prosecutors' questionable reactions include: (1) introducing
an unidentified accomplice to explain the presence of another man's
semen on a rape victim despite no mention of an accomplice in the
confession or the victim's statement; 65 (2) charging a "promiscuous"
63. For example:
[one] bias, the reiteration effect-where confidence in the truth of an assertion naturally
increases if the assertion is repeated-makes it increasingly difficult over time for police
and prosecutors to consider alternative perpetrators or theories of a crime. . . . [B]iases,
especially belief perseverance, are responsible for prosecutorial resistance to the
possibility of innocence before a DNA test, and even after a DNA test excludes the
suspect as the perpetrator.
Aronson & McMurtrie, supra note 1, at 1483 (citing Findley & Scott, supra note 1, at 313, 319).
Moreover, Professors Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott noted:
Burke explains that a prosecutor's belief in guilt strengthens after a jury returns a guilty
verdict, and this belief continues to taint the prosecutor's analysis of any new evidence
submitted by the defense postconviction. Evidence conflicting with this belief in guilt
results in cognitive dissonance on the part of a prosecutor. Because the conviction of an
innocent person is inconsistent with the ethical prosecutor's belief that charges should be
brought only against suspects who are actually guilty, the ethical prosecutor seeks to
avoid cognitive dissonance by clinging to the original belief in guilt, refusing to believe
that she took part in a wrongful conviction.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1612-13 (2006)).
64. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 414-15 (footnote omitted).
65. Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
InstitutionalIncentives and Bounded Rationality in ProsecutorialDecision Making, 74 MO. L. REV.
999, 1017 n.70 (2009) (quoting James S. Liebman, Comment, The New Death Penalty Debate:
What's DNA Got to Do with It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 543 (2002)) (arguing that
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victim with acquiring DNA excluding the defendant when she engaged
in consensual sex before the rape; 66 (3) claiming DNA on an eight-yearold's underwear could have come from any surface because the
underwear rode above her low-cut pants; 67 and (4) reasoning that,
although the defendant was male, the female DNA in the saliva from a
bite mark might have come from a friend's tears.6 8 In addition to
reinventing the theory or attacking the credibility of the victim, another
problematic (and hopefully isolated) reaction
is attacking the credibility
69
of students working on innocence cases.
"prosecutors have become more sophisticated about hypothesizing the existence of 'unindicted coejaculators' ... to explain how the defendant can still be guilty, though another man's semen is
found on the rape-murder victim").
66. On "promiscuous" victims, Professor Orenstein noted:
Although the DNA testing, which was performed eleven years after the trial, indicated
that an unknown man was the source of the semen, and the DNA of the semen and on the
cigarette matched that unknown man, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied
Criner's motion for a new trial. The court accepted the State's two new theories of the
crime: (1) that Criner could have been wearing a condom during the assault or have
failed to ejaculate, or (2) that the semen resulted from the victim's having engaged in
consensual sex prior to her murder. As to this new second theory, the prosecution argued
that it was likely because the victim was known to have been promiscuous and probably
had consensual sex with someone else before the rape. "Had she been pure and virginal,
yes, the DNA test would have been more definitive," the prosecutor said.
Orenstein, supra note 1, at 414 (citing Bob Burtman, Hard Time, HOUS. PRESS (Sept. 10,
1998), http://www.houstonpress.com/1998-09-10/feature/hard-time/).
67. On low-cut pants, Professor Orenstein noted:
Tyler Sanchez, who is developmentally disabled, was accused of molesting an eightyear-old girl, a crime to which he confessed afler a seventeen-hour interrogation, which
Sanchez claims was coerced. The male skin-cell DNA on the girl's underwear matched
her father and an unknown male-not Sanchez. District Attorney Carol Chambers
justified her continuing prosecution of the case: "With the low-cut jeans that girls wear,
[the eight-year-old victim] could have picked up anyone's DNA off any surface her
panties touched while they may have been riding up above her pants."
Id. at 415 (footnote omitted) (quoting Susan Greene, District Attorney Turns Blind Eye to DNA
Evidence, DENVER POST, Feb. 21,2010, at B-0 1). The DA continued to theorize:
Other potential sources of the DNA, according to Chambers, were "the back of her chair
at school, a restaurant, the couch at home that someone else had been sitting on, a bus
seat, someone's toilet seat if she did not pull them down far enough-there are many
ways to get unknown DNA on clothing. Another kid could have snapped the elastic on
her underwear-kids do that sort of thing."
Id. at 415 n.72.
68. Id. at 415-16.
69. See id. at 417. In one situation:
Anita Alverez, a Chicago prosecutor, has reacted to an exoneration investigation by
attacking the integrity of the Innocence Project at Northwestern University. As part of
her response to the assertion of a prisoner's innocence, she has issued subpoenas and
otherwise sought to investigate the students working at the Innocence Project at
Northwestern. Her investigation's focus has moved beyond the facts of the prisoner's
case and includes a leaked internal prosecution memorandum with false defamatory
information about students from a thirteen-year-old case, subpoenaing the students'
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In light of the above examples and studies, the prosecutors'
pronouncements that no problems exist are wrong. The above examples
independently show the conflict of interest operating on prosecutors'
behavior. But the public pronouncements also suggest a subtler problem.
If we assume that the prosecutors acted in good faith in making these
pronouncements, the pronouncements suggest that prosecutors do not
fully understand that they themselves make mistakes in this context.
Perhaps they believe that it might happen in other jurisdictions-but not
in theirs. Such good-faith-but-incorrect beliefs are a macrocosm of what
happens in meritorious post-conviction cases. Some prosecutors just do
not believe that they could have made such a mistake; the prosecutors,
after all, used witnesses, trusted law enforcement agents, and juries or
plea acceptance procedures. Indeed, they used themselves, either in the
first person or in the collegial deputy district attorney down the halland both of whom are good people.
B. An Unhealthy Fearof Civil Liability
The fear of liability, civil or otherwise, can create a conflict of
interest in the prosecutors and even in their offices.7v Prosecutors' recent
opposing comments to the Model Rule 3.8 Amendment, if taken
seriously, evidence a deep-seated fear of civil liability in the postconviction context. 7' As a preliminary matter, this fear is legally
unprecedented in this context. In fact, the Supreme Court partially
justifies the grant of broad civil immunity to prosecutors on the very
basis that prosecutors are subject to professional disciplinary rules.72
Thus, because "a prosecutor stands... amenab[le] to professional
discipline by an association of his peers[, this fact] undermine[s] the
argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure
that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons
accused of crime., 73 And this strong immunity has been specifically
grades, and making unsubstantiated claims that student investigators bribed and flirted
with witnesses.

Id.
70. See Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors, supranote 10, at 227; supra Part II.
71. See Comment of the Pima County Attorney, supra note 45, at 2-3; Comments of the
USAO, supra note 45, at 4-6; Maricopa County Attorney's Comments, supranote 48, at 7.
72. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361-63 (2011) (suggesting that, because
prosecutors are subject to professional discipline, there is little reason to impose civil liability for
failing to train subordinate prosecutors on their disclosure obligations); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409,428-29 (1976).
73. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. Inaddition, Scope 20 of the Model Rules states, in relevant part:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been
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applied to the post-conviction context.74 Finally, the ABA Amendment
includes commentary assuring that a prosecutor's erroneous-but-goodfaith judgment about
the merits of post-conviction evidence is not an
75
ethical violation.
For personal interest conflicts purposes, however, it does not matter
that the prosecutors' fear is objectively unreasonable in most cases; 76 if
77
the fear would materially limit the prosecutors' actions, it is a conflict.

breached.... The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to
be a basis for civil liability.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 20 (2012).
74. See Warney v. Monroe Cnty., 587 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, because
disclosing exculpatory evidence post-conviction pursuant to Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h) is part of the
prosecutor's "advocacy function," prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity). The court justified
this immunity precisely because it did not want prosecutors fearing personal liability:
Moreover, the availability of absolute immunity in [the post-conviction] context will
likely encourage prosecutors in the future to seek exculpatory information posttrial....
Prosecutors facing tough choices as to whether or not to seek exculpatory
information post-conviction should not have to fear personal liability in the event that
issues are raised later as to the evaluation and disclosure of what is learned during the
pendency of post-conviction proceedings. Such a peril would be an incentive to avoid
exculpatory inquiries.
Id.at 126.
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 9.
76. See, e.g., APAAC's Comments to Petition, supra note 45, at 3 (citing no legal support for
its immunity propositions); see also Memorandum from Louise Ing, President, Haw. State Bar
Ass'n, to Chief Justice Mark. E. Recktenwald, Supreme Court of Haw. Il (Oct. 31, 2011),
available at http://hsba.org/resources/l/HRPCFINALFinal 201etter0 2Oto/20CJ/20re%/20
HRPC.pdf (expressing prosecutors' similar fear that the amendment might jeopardize their civil
immunity). Our petition had previously shown the prosecutors that no cases impose civil liability on
prosecutors for investigating their mistakes (and indeed, existing case law suggests that civil
immunity is a privilege bestowed in part because prosecutors are still subject to ethical rules). The
Maricopa County Attorney's Office (which handles the felony prosecutions in Phoenix) cited two
cases to support its position that the duty to investigate will subject prosecutors to civil liability, but
neither addressed these circumstances at all. See Maricopa County Attorney's Comments, supra
note 48, at7 (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); State v. Superior Court, 921
P.2d 697, 700 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)). Rather, in Buckley, the Court stated: "Respondents have not
cited any authority that supports an argument that a prosecutor's fabrication of false evidence during
the preliminary investigation of an unsolved crime was immune from liability at common law, either
in 1871 or at any date before the enactment of § 1983." See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275. Similarly, in
Superior Court,the court observed: "As to the discovery violation, it is clear that absolute immunity
applies, since the conduct of discovery is both quasi-judicial and within the prosecutor's authority."
Superior Court, 921 P.2d at 701 (concluding that only prosecutor's statements to the press were not
protected by absolute civil immunity).
77. See supra Part II (discussing the personal interest conflicts rules). Indeed, deeply held
religious and moral beliefs can lead to a disqualifying conflict of interest; obviously those beliefs are
not fully dependent on proof, legal or otherwise. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.10 cmt. 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 cmt. c (2000).
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The prosecutors' stated fear suggests that it will indeed limit their
actions on justice's behalf. Taking them at their word, then, we can see
the conflict.
C. ProsecutorsAre the Regulators,Not the Regulated
Several prosecutorial offices took the explicit or implicit position
that courts cannot regulate prosecutors.78 This position is outdated and
largely meritless for two reasons:79 (1) "the courts regulate prosecutorsqua prosecutors-in analogous contexts quite frequently, '80 and (2) "as a
general matter, prosecutors are legally and appropriately subject to
ethical regulation"-as are all other attorneys. 81 Both state and federal
prosecutors can be, and are, regulated. 2
78. See APAAC's Comments to Petition, supra note 45, at 3 ("Prosecutors cannot be ordered
to investigate.").
79. The U.S. Attorney's Offices in Alaska, California, Hawaii, and Washington also
challenged the investigation requirement and to some extent regulation generally. See Memorandum
from California U.S. Attorneys, supra note 50, at 6; Memorandum from Washington State U.S.
Attorney, supra note 49, at 4; Memorandum from Alaska U.S. Attorney, supra note 49, at 4;
Memorandum from Hawaii U.S. Attorney, supra note 49, at 15; see also Green, supra note 47, at
890-93 (describing the opposition by certain prosecutors to adoption of the Amendment in
Tennessee and Washington). The proposed amendment, of course, did not actually require
investigation, as noted again below.
80. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 11; see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16;
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 (requiring various disclosure obligations on the state on penalty of sanction);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (prohibiting prosecutions without probable cause); id.
R. 3.8(e) (imposing limitations on prosecutors' ability to subpoena lawyers); id. R. 3.8(f) (imposing
limitations on prosecutors' pretrial public statements). The Arizona ethical rules have contained the
same prosecutorial requirements for years. See ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT ER 3.8(a), (d),
(e), (f) (2010).
81. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 11-12.
82. Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted). The Arizona Supreme Court (as an example of other state
high courts) long ago established its inherent authority to regulate lawyers, including sitting county
attorneys. Id. at 12 n.27; see In re Bailey, 248 P. 29, 30 (Ariz. 1926). The court in In re Bailey noted
that:
whenever a practitioner by his conduct shows that he no longer possesses the
qualifications required for his admission, he may be deprived of the privilege theretofore
granted him, and such deprivation may be either under the authority of a statute
prescribing the cause therefor, and the manner of procedure, or the court of its own
inherent power may act.
Id.; see also McMurchie v. Super. Ct. of Yavapai Cnty., 221 P. 549, 551 (Ariz. 1923). The court in
McMurchie noted:
The assumption that the court's jurisdiction is limited to the express provisions of this
statute is based upon totally false premises. All courts exercising general and commonlaw jurisdiction possess the inherent right to require lawyers practicing at their bar to so
conduct themselves that they shall neither bring reproach upon their profession nor in
any way impede the due administration of justice. This is a right not derived from statute,
nor held at the will of the Legislature. It is essential to the orderly administration of
justice.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2006) ("An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws
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The opposition "specifically argued that the [c]ourt cannot, or at
least should not, impose on [prosecutors] a duty to investigate. 8 3 As a
preliminary matter, however, the proposed amendment did not require
investigation: prosecutors could choose to investigate (which they might
want to do at a minimum to make sure that the actual criminal is not out
committing additional crimes) or more simply "make reasonable efforts
More importantly for present purposes, "[i]t
to cause an investigation.
is neither dangerous nor burdensome to prosecutors to request that the
local police department or FBI investigate the matter in light of 'new,
credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a
convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant
was convicted."' 85 The prosecutorial offices' strong resistance to
this duty suggests "that certain prosecutorial offices would not make
or send that letter in the absence of an ethical rule
that phone call
86
it."
requiring
That is troublingly apathetic behavior, at least when the offices
have received non-frivolous evidence of a wrongful conviction. It is
admittedly unclear to what extent this anti-regulation and apparently
apathetic attitude creates a conflict in specific cases, but it suggests both
a predisposition not to honor the clear role of "minister of justice" and a
resistance to continuous improvement.
D. Defendants, Not Prosecutors,Should Seek Justice
The prosecutorial offices revealed other evidence suggesting (but
not necessarily proving) that some prosecutors within those offices
might be predisposed not to seek justice post-conviction; rather, they
suggested that the wrongfully convicted defendants should seek justice
on their own. The prosecutorial offices effectively "argue[d] that existing
convicted
wrongfully
protect[ed]
[adequately]
laws already

and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney
engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in
that State.").
83. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 12; see APAAC's Comments to
Petition, supranote 44, at 3; Comments of the USAO, supranote 45, at 6-7.
84. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 12; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(g); Saltzburg, supra note 39, at 5-6. In light of these legally meritless but
apparently sincere fears of forced investigations, "[we even] added a sentence [to the Petition]
making this fact doubly clear: 'if the prosecutor makes a reasonable effort to cause an investigation,
it is not necessary for the prosecutor personally to conduct an investigation."' Reply to Prosecutors'
Comments, supranote 48, at 12-13.
85. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 13.
86. Id.
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defendants." 87 But the cited "'panoply' of existing protections, such as
habeas corpus,... [is notoriously difficult,] and ... often impossible[,]
to navigate successfully without 'new, credible, and material' evidence
or the like." 8 Furthermore, "the argument presume[d] that the [probably]
innocent defendant knows of [this] exculpatory evidence in the first
place . ,89 At base, the prosecutorial offices were "simply burdenshifting the executive branch errors onto criminal defendants, some of
the least powerful people in the state." 90 Furthermore, as the studies and
evidence above suggest, "prosecutors often fight post-conviction relief
reflexively and zealously---even in close cases." 9'
At a minimum, this argument suggests (but again does not
prove) callousness toward wrongful convictions, because the suggested
remedies are notoriously slow and often fail. 92 It might also suggest that
certain prosecutorial offices are unlikely to review proactively nonfrivolous claims of wrongful conviction. The "minister of justice" preconviction seems to become "bored of justice" post-conviction.
In sum, these untoward prosecutorial responses to ethical regulation
in the post-conviction context seemingly provide some evidence of the
significant conflicts of interest identified in Part I. This theoretical and
actual conflict can be cured, however, as discussed below.

87. Id.; see APAAC's Comments to Petition, supra note 45, at 2 ("Arizona law provides a
panoply of post-conviction remedies for defendants who believe there is error in their
convictions."); Comment of the Pima County Attorney, supra note 45, at 3 (citing ARIz. R. CRM.
P. 32); Comments of the USAO, supra note 45, at 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254-55); Maricopa
County Attorney's Comments, supra note 48, at 5 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2010);

ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 32).
88. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 13-14; see, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIM.
P. 32.1(e) (requiring for relief "newly discovered material facts [that] ... probably would have
changed the verdict or sentence").
89. Reply to Prosecutors' Comments, supra note 48, at 14 ("For example, an inmate locked
up in prison with no attorney, no money, and no legal education, has few resources to 'discover'
new evidence and file a timely, complete, and persuasive habeas petition.").

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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THE CURE: CONFLICTS COUNSEL

Few prosecutors (or other humans) are actually bad apples.9 3 Their
offices just have bad structure in post-conviction matters. Rather than
demand that prosecutorial offices adopt structures enabling optimal
decision-making when they review post-conviction claims, however, the
ABA and the NDAA have effectively urged a different solution: "muscle
through" the conflict. 94 In other words, both influential organizations

have officially suggested that prosecutors should just suppress the
conflict and act better in cases in which prosecutors have likely
convicted the wrong person. Although this approach is simplistically
understandable and better than the previous state of nearly zero
regulation, it misses a greater opportunity: structural change. After
explaining the "muscle through" (or "just stop it") approach of the ABA
and NDAA, I turn to three structural changes that would each improve
post-conviction review. These changes are consistent with the more
modem, effective, and comprehensive way to approach legal ethics:
focus less on individual decisions in discrete cases and more on the
structure in which decisions will be made. 95
The recent, and otherwise laudable, changes to both the ABA and
rules are directed primarily at the individual
NDAA ethical
"prosecutor." 96 These new rules correctly tell the prosecutor to disclose
93. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, The RelationshipBetween ProsecutorialMisconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIs. L. REv. 399, 400; see also infra
note 95 (citing literature on structural or situational forces influencing behavior). Professor Peter A.
Joy argued:
My thesis is that prosecutorial misconduct is not chiefly the result of isolated instances of
unprincipled choices or the failure of character on the part of some prosecutors. Rather,
prosecutorial misconduct is largely the result of three institutional conditions: vague
ethics rules that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary authority
with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for prosecutorial misconduct,
which create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from,
prosecutorial misconduct. These three conditions converge to create uncertain norms and
a general lack of accountability for how prosecutors view and carry out their ethical and
institutional obligations.
Joy, supra.
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)-(h), R. 3.8 cmts. 7-8 (2012); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 8-1.8 & cmt. (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 2009).
95. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Past, Present, and Future of Legal Ethics: Three
Comments for David Luban, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1365, 1372-75 (2008) ("If in practice judgment is
swamped by the pressures of circumstance, perhaps we should spend less time focusing on
judgment and more on circumstance. In particular, we should be studying and teaching about how
practice can be structured in ways that make for ethically better decisions."). See generally PHILIP
ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING How GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007)
(documenting the heavy impact of "situational forces" on human misbehavior).
96. The ABA rule, for instance, tells the "prosecutor"-if the conviction was obtained in their
"jurisdiction"-to investigate or cause an investigation and, if clear and convincing evidence
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exculpatory evidence, to look into likely cases of wrongful convictions,
and if the prosecutor got it wrong, to seek the release of the wrongfully
imprisoned person. The rules fall short, however, in their apparent
addressee: 97 they tell the conflict-infected prosecutor to go against
human psychology by objectively reviewing and publicly admitting the
mistakes of their own, their close colleagues, and their offices. The
NDAA National Prosecution Standards 98 (the "Standards") vividly
illustrate this "muscle through" approach. The Standards first
acknowledge that fairly evaluating an innocence claim may constitute
"the greatest challenge a prosecutor will have to face, especially in a
situation where the evidence, after being reasonably evaluated, indicates
that a mistake has been made." 99 It is the "greatest challenge," but one
that must be overpowered: "the prosecutor must put aside concerns of
personal embarrassment and pride, the possible embarrassment to law
enforcement, and any other factors that would deter him or her from
seeing that justice is accomplished."' 00
establishes that an innocent person has been convicted, to remedy the conviction. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)-(h). Although the "prosecutor" in the jurisdiction of conviction need
not be the conflicted prosecutor, her colleagues, or supervisors, the implication is there, and the
issue is, at a minimum, not helpfully addressed in the rule or the accompanying official
commentary. See id. R. 3.8. cmts. 7-8.
The NDAA guidance refers also simply to the "prosecutor":
When the prosecutor is satisfied that a convicted person is actually innocent, the
prosecutor should notify the appropriate court . . and the defense attorney or the
defendant ... and seek the release of the defendant if incarcerated. If the prosecutor
becomes aware of material and credible evidence which leads him or her to reasonably
believe a defendant may be innocent of a crime for which the defendant has been
convicted, the prosecutor should disclose ... such evidence to the appropriate court
and.., to the defense attorney or to the defendant ....
NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 8-1.8.
97. To be sure, the rules are flexible enough to permit less-conflicted "prosecutors" to review
the post-conviction matter. Perhaps a fairer characterization, then, is that the ABA and NDAA
simply paid insufficient attention to the ideal addressee. Elsewhere, however, the ABA has arguably
implied that the conflicted prosecutor should indeed handle the matter. See STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES Standard 22-1.3(b) (1986) ("The legal officer with
primary responsibility for responding to an application for postconviction relief should be an officer
with responsibility for the administration of criminal justice, such as the attorney general, or the
localprosecutor who representedthe government in the originalprosecution." (emphasis added)).
98.

NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 2009).

99. Id. Standard 8-1.8 cmt.; cf id. Standard 8-1.6 ("The prosecutor shall not assert or contest
an issue on collateral review unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so. The basis should not
be frivolous .... "); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 33.11 (c) (1993) ("A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence because he or she
believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused.").
100. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 8-1.8 cmt. It is empirically questionable how
well humans can muscle through their own conflicts, even when ethical rules command it. See
Eldred, supra note 20, at 72-77 (noting that, in light of the existing empirical studies, "there is little
reason to believe that the governing [ethical] rules will be able to check the unconscious pull of self-
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Although both the ABA and NDAA had a good goal in mind, their
means are incomplete. A more complete, and likely more effective,
approach would have more particularly described who or what should be
(and should not be) reviewing these claims. From a conflicts perspective,
the rules should be subsequently amended to include such an approach.
Three alternative approaches follow, and they essentially range from
better to best:
Approach I: The prosecutor 0l ' should not be the sole reviewer or
decision-maker in evaluating evidence that a person may have been
wrongfully convicted;
Approach II: The prosecutorial office should create a separate unit
within the office to evaluate evidence that a person may have been
wrongfully convicted; 10 2 or

Approach III: The prosecutorial office should refer evidence that a
person may have been wrongfully convicted to another prosecutorial
office or independent agency for evaluation.
Before elaborating a bit on the above improvements, a global
clarification is in order: In each iteration, the prosecutor10 3 would remain
vitally important, of course; she knows the case-the witnesses, the
agents, the file, and more. Her cooperation is, therefore, essential.' °4 But
in each iteration, she would not be making or exercising clout over the
evaluation of the evidence and disposition.

interest").
101. The term "prosecutor" means any prosecutor in the office who participated personally and
substantially in the prosecution, appeal, or collateral review proceedings. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (d)(2) (adopting a similar, long-standing test in a different conflicts
context).
102. See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1-3.4. Standard 1-3.4 under the Standards
states:
Each prosecutor's office should establish procedures for handling actual or potential
conflicts of interest. These procedures should include, but are not limited to: a. The
creation of firewalls and taint or filter teams to ensure that prosecutors with a conflict are
not improperly exposed to information or improperly disclose information; and b.
Methods to accurately document the manner in which conflicts were handled to ensure
public trust and confidence in the prosecutor's office.
Id; see also Barry Scheck, Professionaland Conviction Integrity Programs. Why We Need Them,
Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2215, 2250-51 (2010)
(discussing best practices for such a unit).
103. See supra note 101 (defining "prosecutor" for these purposes).
104. To be sure, there is danger in permitting the prosecutor to play any role, but protecting the
subsequent reviewer from the prosecutor's preconceived theories and perspectives would be almost
impossible (in that those theories and perspectives would already be memorialized in the record).
See O'Brien, supra note 65, at 1046 (citing Jos6 H. Kertstholt & Aletta R. Eikelboom, Effects of
PriorInterpretation on Situation Assessment in Crime Analysis, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
455, 457-64 (2007)) (describing a study finding "knowledge of the primary investigators' theory of
the case influenced the independent analysts-despite their expertise and mandate to be objective").
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Approach I (the "better" approach) is the simplest and most
flexible. It cures the direct conflict by ensuring that the conflicted
prosecutor is neither the sole reviewer nor ultimate decision-maker in the
post-conviction matter.10 5 Although the approach of the United States
Attorneys' Manual (the "Manual") 10 6 is unduly limited to prosecutorial
"misconduct," the Manual roughly follows this innovation: "Before any
pleading or other document concerning any non-frivolous allegation of
serious misconduct is filed, whether in the district court or on appeal, it
must be reviewed by a supervisor who is not implicated by the
allegation," and "[a] Department attorney who is found to have engaged
in misconduct shall not represent the United States in litigation
concerning the misconduct finding, unless approval is obtained from
the
10 7
responsible United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General."
Approach I is attractively flexible; every other detail is left to the
prosecutorial office, in light of its priorities, resources, existing structure,
and other variables. At a minimum, though, the office should publicly
praise and otherwise incentivize the designated reviewers who challenge
the integrity of likely wrongful convictions. 108 Although many obstacles
will remain for such prosecutors, it would help. 0 9 Approach I,
105. Orenstein, supra note 1, at 444-45 (citing Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors,supra note
10, at 237-38). Professor Orenstein noted:
[Diesignating an experienced decisionmaker who did not play a role in the original
prosecution ... would have the benefit of cultivating expertise as well as allowing the
necessary emotional neutrality and distance to enable the responsible individual to
analyze the issue dispassionately and to combat cognitive bias, tunnel vision, and denial.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Eldred, supra note 20, at 80 n. 179 ("Research indicates that
distancing the person with conflicting duties from the decision on whether a conflict exists is the
best way to reduce the impact of the conflict .... ").
106. U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual (1997), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/.
107. Id. § 1-4.130(A)-(B), availableat http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/
usam/titlel/4mdoj.htm#l -4.130.
108. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 172 (2004) [hereinafter Medwed, The Zeal Deal].
Professor Medwed noted:
[A] prosecutor's decision to turn over biological evidence for DNA testing without
litigating the case, and ultimately being ordered by the court to do so, should be lauded
within the office and taken into consideration for promotion purposes in cases where the
testing ultimately exonerates the inmate. In such situations, the choice to work with the
defense saves time and may avoid the possibility of a flogging by the media, both of
which are likely desirable from the perspective of high-ranking officials within the
organization.
Id.
109. Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligationsof Prosecutorsin Cases
Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 409 (2002). Judith A.
Goldberg and Professor David M. Siegel noted:
There are individual and institutional pressures that may deter prosecutors from
cooperating with a defendant's request for postconviction testing. For instance, the
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nevertheless, is detrimentally limited in that it does nothing to ensure
that the reviewers or decision-makers are professionally distanced from
the prosecutor herself; indeed, they could be in the same unit, division,
or hallway."t 0 It also does little to improve prosecutorial incentives,
which typically are set to convict, not reverse, and it does little to grant
prosecutors some relief from their oft-overcrowded caseloads while they
are reviewing these claims.
Approach II (the "better still" approach) would therefore create a
separate unit within the prosecutorial office."' This approach is inspired
by and essentially the same as Dallas County's so-far effective
individual prosecutor faces institutional and public pressure to maintain the integrity of a
conviction. The number of convictions obtained may be a measure of a prosecutor's
individual success or failure. Prosecutors may be perceived as being "soft" on crime or
sympathetic towards defendants if they assist with, or fail to object to, postconviction
testing. On a personal level, prosecutors may have worked with victims and investigators
of horrific crimes, and may be loathe to reopen unsettling experiences. Prosecutors may
themselves be invested in the knowledge or belief that the perpetrator has been punished
and the case concluded.
Id.(footnote omitted) (citing Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It Is Not Whether You Win or
Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for
Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 292 (2001)); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 107-08
(199 1). Professor Zacharias noted:
Practical and institutional incentives reinforce this natural tendency [toward winning and
advocacy in trial practice]. Government lawyers compete with each other for promotion
and recognition. Prosecutors who restrain themselves may convict at a lower rate and
thus appear less competent to their superiors. An ethical prosecutor's productivity may
decline as well. Some of the actions necessary for "doing justice" may delay trials.
Reporting ineffective defense counsel will provoke hearings. Providing previously
undisclosed information will lead to defense motions. Because the ethical prosecutor
consequently will process fewer cases, she may damage her reputation with a
production-oriented bench. To the extent her actions highlight poor performance by
defense counsel, her relationship with the bar also may deteriorate.
Id. at 108.
110. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 509 ("Research on cognitive bias suggests that
this responsibility should not be entrusted to the prosecutor who secured the conviction, and in
many circumstances, should not be entrusted to that prosecutor's office."). For similar reasonsincluding lack of objectivity-the post-conviction investigation should generally not be assigned
exclusively to the original investigator. See Laurie L. Levenson, Post-Conviction Death Penalty
Investigations: The Need for Independent Investigators, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S225, S240 (2011)
("Currently, no court rules or ethical codes govern the assignment of investigators to post-conviction
cases. Out of habit, prosecutors routinely use the same agent who originally investigated the
criminal charge, even when the post-conviction allegations involve claims of police misconduct and
misleading identification procedures."). A similar problem can exist for the original judge. See, e.g.,
Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered
Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 655, 699 (2005) ("[M]any new trial motions
and post-conviction petitions premised on newly discovered non-DNA evidence are directed to the
trial judge who handled the case originally" even though "it is only human nature for people to
struggle when asked to reexamine their own work.").
111. See Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, supra note 35, at 62-66.
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Conviction Integrity Unit." 2 The separate unit would report directly to
the district attorney, county attorney, or first assistant and would exist
primarily to review post-conviction innocence and injustice claims,
including claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 1 3 In these ways, the unit
would boast a measure of independence and would be incentivized to
reverse injustice, not merely to convict. 1 4 The separate unit would also
have the inside advantage-the prosecutor, the other players, and the file
would be both accessible and known commodities." 5 Of course, "the
inside advantage" is also a disadvantage when it comes to conflicts and
bias within that office.'1 6 Moreover, in cases of widespread misconduct,
for example, the unit's location within the same office might be

112. See generally Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of
Getting It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1033 (2012). Mike Ware noted that since
the unit's creation:
there have been thirteen DNA exonerations in Dallas County (for a total of twenty-two),
as well as four non-DNA exonerations and three defendants who obtained postconviction relief because of Brady violations discovered during CIU investigations. In
addition, ten previously unknown actual perpetrators have been identified through
investigations initiated by the C1U.
Id. at 1041 (footnote omitted).
113. See Scheck, supra note 102, at 2251; Ware, supra note 112, at 1034. These units might be
gaining momentum:
[T]he idea of creating prosecutorial postconviction units has become increasingly
popular. Dallas County prosecutor Craig Watkins created a Conviction Integrity Unit in
July 2007 staffed by a senior deputy chief, a full-time assistant district attorney, an
investigator, and a legal assistant. The division took on a review of over 400 DNA cases
and also pledged to evaluate every case-DNA and non-DNA-where evidence
identifies a perpetrator other than the defendant. During its first two years in operation,
Watkins's unit helped to exonerate at least eight inmates convicted in Dallas County.
New York County District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance Jr. announced the launch of a
comparable program in March 2010. Led by an experienced assistant district attorney,
the program will include a panel often prosecutors to assess cases and office practices as
well as a group of outside experts to offer advice on policy matters.
Medwed, Prosecutorial Ethics, supra note 39, at 334 & n.17 (footnotes omitted) (citing James C.
McKinley Jr., Cleared, and Pondering the Value of27 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A12)
("Patricia Lykos became the chief prosecutor in Houston, Texas, in 2008 and instituted a
postconviction review unit.... As of August 2010, that squad had helped to release three
wrongfully convicted inmates.").
114. See Scheck, supra note 102, at 2250-51 (observing pointedly several key characteristics of
a successful unit). For example, the unit should have the full and public support of the office's head
prosecutor, independence, and positive relationships with innocence projects and public defender
offices. See id.
115. See Medwed, The Zeal Deal, supranote 108, at 175-76.
116. See id. at 176-77 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of creating internal
innocence and post-conviction units and noting that "[o]ne drawback of the proposed formation of
innocence wings within prosecutorial agencies, however, is that it would not thoroughly obviate the
conflict of interest issue-prosecutors in the unit would still be reviewing the work of their peers or
former peers in the organization").
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7

Finally, the

office

might not have

accommodate a separate unit practically and effectively.

the

213

size to

8

Approach III (the "best" approach), in light of Approach 11's
weaknesses, would appoint a separate prosecutorial office or innocence

commission to review claims of innocence (and perhaps prosecutorial
misconduct)." 9 For example, the attorney general's office would review
2
claims involving the district or county attorney's office and vice versa. 0
This approach would completely cure the conflicts by removing not only

117. See, e.g., NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1-3.4 cmt. (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys
Ass'n 2009) ("If [conflicts screening methods within the office] are or are likely to be ineffective,
the chief prosecutor should seek a qualified special prosecutor and offer appropriate assistance.");
see also State v. Stenger, 760 P.2d 357, 360 (Wash. 1988) (disqualifying prosecutor's office because
prosecutor had previously represented the defendant and instead of being screened, the prosecutor
participated in the early stages of the prosecution).
118. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 509. Professors Green and Yaroshefsky noted:
[T]he Dallas County experience teaches that with appropriate leadership, structure and
personnel, a large, urban office can create an independent internal unit to follow up on
new evidence and to investigate post-conviction innocence claims. Similarly, smaller
prosecutors' offices could pool their resources to create a unit to investigate claims from
each of their counties, or they could seek the agreement of the state attorney general's
office to review such claims.
Id. Professor Medwed similarly noted:
[Iln light of the small size of most prosecutors' offices, the bulk of these agencies may
lack a sufficient number of attorneys to establish a separate post-conviction division.
Housing post-conviction units with the state attorney general's office could be an
efficient alternative to the placement of these divisions in county prosecutorial offices,
and might minimize the potential for intra-organizational resentment by creating greater
distance between trial and post-conviction prosecutors.
Medwed, The Zeal Deal,supra note 108, at 176 (footnotes omitted).
119. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 509. Professors Green and Yaroshefsky noted:
Where an investigation and evaluation cannot be conducted by an internal prosecutorial
unit that maintains a non-adversarial and open mindset to consider the potential of a
wrongful conviction, it might be preferable to adopt systems of review similar to those in
England, Canada, or North Carolina, that entrust investigations and evaluations to
independent bodies having internal, graduated processes for responding to new,
exculpatory evidence.
Id. Further, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg and Hyland Hunt noted:
[T]he prosecutor's evaluation of the defendant's claim of innocence, and his decision to
act upon that evaluation, can make a substantial difference to the defendant's chance of
obtaining relief. The difficulty of requiring an adversarial actor to play this kind of nonadversarial role after conviction has prompted one American state and a few other
countries to turn to alternative models.
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Hyland Hunt, The Prosecutor and Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence:
DNA and Beyond?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 771, 788 (2010).
120. Arizona has a noteworthy arrangement along these lines: "The [Arizona] Justice Project,
in a unique partnership with the Attorney General's Office and the Arizona Criminal Justice
Commission, recently received a grant from the National Institute of Justice for post-conviction
DNA testing of forcible rape, murder, and non-negligent homicide cases that might demonstrate
actual innocence." The Arizona Justice Project: Helping Inmates with Wrongful Convictions, ARIZ.
JUST. PROJECT, http://www.azjusticeproject.org/project (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
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the prosecutor but also the entire affected office. It would put an
objective and disinterested office in charge of reviewing mistakes or
misconduct. Appointing similar "special prosecutors" and creating other
conflicts procedures, moreover, are well-established innovations in other
contexts. 12 The Approach's critical distance, however, does pose a
downside in that access to the prosecutor, the other players, and the file
will present possible challenges. 122 It is imperative, therefore, that both a
rule and a practice of inter-office cooperation are in effect. 123 Although
the cooperation challenge is surmountable, this deeply (re)structural
approach itself can be insurmountable. Certain states' constitutions,
resources, and political tides, as examples, likely limit the ability to
create or empower a separate office to conduct these reviews.124
But a do-nothing approach is, by far, the worst. If insurmountable
challenges preclude Approach III, the prosecutorial office should adopt
Approach II, and failing that, Approach I (or a customized variant of any
of the Approaches). Any of the three approaches would markedly
mitigate conflicts of interest when prosecutorial offices must review
claims of innocence or prosecutorial misconduct. The only wrong choice
would be to continue to address strong conflicts of interest with an
inherently conflicted structure-or no structure at all.
121. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Cal. 1981) (citing
D'Amico v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 520 P.2d 10, 20 (Cal. 1974)) ("There is no question that at such
time as he believed a potential conflict existed, the Attorney General could, as he did, properly
withdraw as counsel for his state clients and authorize them to employ special counsel.");
NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1-3.5. In particular, Standard 1-3.5 states, in relevant
part:
Where an actual or potential conflict of interest exists that would prevent the
prosecutor's office from investigating or prosecuting a criminal matter, the prosecutor's
office should appoint, or seek the appointment of, a "special prosecutor" or refer the
matter to the appropriate governmental authority, as required by law. Under those
circumstances where a special prosecutor is appointed[,] ... [t]he special prosecutor
should be ... perceived as having sufficient detachment from the prosecutor's office so
as not to be influenced by any actual or potential conflict;... [and] [s]ubject to the need
to avoid the appearance of a conflict, a chief prosecutor and his or her assistants and staff
should give all appropriate assistance, cooperation, and support to a special prosecutor.
Id.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
123. See, e.g., NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1-3.5; id. Standard 2-4.5 ("The
office of the prosecutor and the office of the state attorney general, where separate and distinct
entities, should cooperate whenever practicable in the furtherance ofjustice.").
124. See, e.g., Steven W. Perry & Duren Banks, Prosecutorsin State Courts, 2007- Statistical
Tables, in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PROSECUTORS SURVEY [CENSUS], 2007, at 1, 2, 4
tbl.2 (2012), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/file?comp=none&study-33202&ds=
l&fileid= 1079790. Seventy-four percent of "prosecutors' offices served districts with a population
of less than 100,000 residents." Id. "In full-time offices serving fewer than 100,000 residents, on
average, offices included one chief prosecutor, three assistant prosecutors, one victim advocate, one
legal services staff, one investigator, and three support staff." Id.
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CONCLUSION

Everyone makes mistakes. Notwithstanding suggestions to the
contrary, prosecutors have indeed made, and will continue to make,
mistakes in both pre- and post-conviction practice. What counts is how
we handle those inevitable mistakes: whether we make improvements to
avoid and correct the inevitable mistakes of the future. To err is human,
and that is why we subject ourselves to regulation-especially when we
are in positions as powerful and important as prosecutors. To eliminate
or mitigate the conflicts of interest currently enduring in post-conviction
practice would be an improvement. Undoubtedly, other solutions exist to
cure these conflicts of interest beyond the three simple solutions
proposed in this Article, but these three structural solutions have
precedent and efficacy to commend them. "Conviction confliction" can
indeed be cured.
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